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TENT CITIES AND RLUIPA: HOW A NEW RELIGIOUSLAND-USE ISSUE AGGRAVATES RLUIPA
Kelli Stout

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

In 1983, when St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church challenged the City of Hoboken’s use of its zoning power to shut down
the church’s homeless shelter, the New Jersey Superior Court ex1
pressed outrage. In a brief opinion, the court wrote,
The harm here is obvious, imminent and severe. If the shelter
is closed its occupants will be left without food or shelter. Government alone is not presently able to cope with this grave social
problem. St. John’s represents the only bulwark these homeless
people have. To tear that bulwark away would be a travesty of justice and compassion. Any inconvenience to the City of Hoboken
and its other residents pales into insignificance when contrasted
with what the occupants of the shelter would have to face if
2
turned out into the city streets in winter weather.

Today, this weighing of the social importance of a church’s practice is
absent from judicial analysis in religious-land-use cases. In its place is
a long line of inconsistent precedent and statutes, each attempting to
articulate a test that accurately reflects the true meaning of the right
to free exercise of religion.
Since the United States Supreme Court narrowed its interpreta3
tion of the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division, Department of
4
Human Resources v. Smith, the controversy over the proper treatment
of religious land use has continued to challenge courts. Congress re∗

J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. 2008, University of Kansas. Thank you to Professor Catherine McCauliff and to Charlie Wilkes
for their invaluable guidance throughout the writing process.
1
See St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935,
939 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
2
Id. (citation omitted).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4
See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)
(“But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or
even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the
appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts.”).
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sponded swiftly to Smith, enacting a statute to make the free exercise
of religion broader than the Smith Court had envisioned. These statutory changes, however, led to a series of inconsistent decisions in
the area of religious land use.
Currently, temporary homeless shelters or tent cities pose new
problems for courts struggling to find the proper analysis for determining whether restrictions on religious land use run afoul of the
Free Exercise Clause. By enacting the Religious Land Use and Insti5
tutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000, Congress provided a statutory solution to some religious-land-use problems. But the statute’s
intended goal—broadening the scope of free exercise after Smith—is
not always served in cases where churches are hosting homeless shelters. Some circuit courts have defined RLUIPA’s requirement of a
“substantial burden on a religious exercise” in a restrictive way and
thus have impeded the statute’s intended protections for religious
6
land uses. Conversely, in some cases, Smith works to protect religious
7
institutions subject to unfavorable city ordinances. Due to this discrepancy, courts need to streamline their approach to religious-landuse cases to establish reliable precedent and restore public confidence in fair adjudication.
Although Smith articulates a standard for the application of the
Free Exercise Clause, it has been subject to inconsistent application
and much confusion. The unique case of tent cities shows the need
for a clearer, more precisely defined test. RLUIPA provides the applicable standard in the tent city context, but its failure to define what
constitutes a “substantial burden on religious exercise” has also
caused inconsistency. To resolve this definitional confusion, federal
courts should model a new test from the Washington Supreme
5

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
(2006).
6
See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006)
(adding that a substantial burden must render the religious exercise “effectively impractical” (citing Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752,
761 (7th Cir. 2003))); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024,
1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining substantial burden as “a significantly great restriction
or onus upon such exercise”).
7
See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1353,
1362 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (ruling in favor of a church whose meal program for the
homeless was shut down by city ordinance where the church showed that the ordinance, although neutral and generally applicable, had no legitimate government interest); Fifth Ave. Presbyterian v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 11493, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22185, at *40–41 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004) (holding for a church which passively permitted homeless persons to sleep on its steps during the night after the local government used local laws to force the homeless off the steps), aff’d 177 F. App’x
198 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Court’s standard for substantial burden, which takes into account
both the context of the situation and the alternatives available to
churches when determining if a substantial burden exists under
RLUIPA.
This Comment examines the controversy created by the tests as
applied in religious-land-use cases and how the tests have fared when
religious exercise involves providing services to homeless persons at
the expense of the surrounding community’s right to a quiet and safe
neighborhood. Part II examines the development of the Free Exercise Clause and religious-land-use regulation. Part III shows how the
constitutional and congressional tests for Free Exercise Clause violations have been applied when cities deny churches the ability to host
homeless shelters or feeding programs on their property and, in particular, looks at the conflict that the tests have created for these types
of cases. Lastly, Part IV explores the unique issues tent cities have
posed for courts and how a proper definition of a substantial burden
under RLUIPA could resolve these issues in a way that fairly balances
the interests of local governments and religious freedom.
II. FREE EXERCISE AND RELIGIOUS LAND USE:
COURT VERSUS CONGRESS
Constitutional challenges under the Free Exercise Clause first
appeared in the twentieth century. Initially, the Supreme Court expansively defined the right to free exercise of religion and treated it
8
similarly to other rights. In the past two decades, however, the Court
has curtailed the free exercise right and has made it more difficult for
churches to challenge neutral and generally applicable government
9
measures that burden their religious practices. This has made it especially difficult for churches to challenge land-use regulations and
has set shaky precedent for new religious land uses.
A. The Free Exercise Clause in the Twentieth Century
In the nineteenth century, upon first review of the Free Exercise
Clause, the Supreme Court determined the Clause to mean that
8

See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (requiring a showing of a
compelling government interest to regulate religious conduct).
9
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)
(stating that neutral laws effecting religious practice need not be justified by a compelling government interest); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885 (1990); see also Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 155, 200–13 (2004) (chronicling the changes to the Supreme Court’s approach
in the last two decades).
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“Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion,
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social du10
ties or subversive of good order.” Almost a century later in 1963, the
Court articulated a strict scrutiny standard for any government action
11
that burdened the free exercise of religion.
In Sherbert v. Verner, a Seventh Day Adventist was fired from her
12
job when she refused to work on her Saturday Sabbath day. She was
then denied unemployment benefits for failing to take available jobs
13
that would require her to work on Saturdays. The Court ruled that
the state’s interest in preventing fraudulent benefits claims was not
14
served by this denial of benefits. Ultimately, the Court adopted the
standard that “governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental inter15
est.” This broad reading of the Clause proved fruitful for churches
bringing claims under the Free Exercise Clause because they received
the benefit of the most demanding level of scrutiny for any interference with their free exercise rights, including those laws that apply
16
neutrally.
Nearly three decades later, the law shifted again. In Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, the Court limited the
Sherbert rule to those government actions that are not generally appli17
cable and neutral. Justice Scalia reasoned that Sherbert “stand[s] for
the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
18
‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.” If a law meets the
threshold standard of neutrality and general applicability, the government does not need to show that the action is narrowly tailored to

10

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (“[A]ny incidental burden on
the free exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.’”
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963))).
12
See id. at 399.
13
See id. at 400.
14
See id. at 407–09.
15
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990) (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402–03).
16
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997) (“The application of the
Sherbert test, the Smith decision explained, would have produced an anomaly in the
law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability.”).
17
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
18
Id. at 884 (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
11
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achieve a compelling interest, even if the law burdens religious exer19
cise.
Thus, if the government action that allegedly violates religious
freedom applies to all persons generally and is not targeted to discriminate against a specific group, then courts will review its constitutionality under a rational basis standard of review, asking whether the
government action is rationally related to a legitimate government
20
purpose. If the government action is not neutral and generally applicable to all, then the court will review its constitutionality under
strict scrutiny, asking whether the government action is narrowly tai21
lored to achieve a compelling government interest. Applying this
reasoning, the Court in Smith found that the plaintiff’s use of peyote,
in violation of a neutral and generally applicable criminal law, did
not exempt them from the law and its consequences, including the
22
loss of unemployment benefits.
The holding of Smith, however, left open many questions. Justice Scalia did not explain how narrowly or broadly to interpret the
Sherbert exception for laws that are not neutral and generally applica23
ble—those “individualized [government] assessments.”
Does the
exception only apply to discretionary benefits programs like in Sherbert or does it extend to local government zoning decisions? With no
guidance as to the scope of the exception, lower courts are split on
whether the exception applies to zoning-board decisions to grant or
deny applications for variances, conditional permits, or accessory-use
24
permits.
19
See id. at 886 n.3 (“Our conclusion that generally applicable, religion-neutral
laws that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest is the only approach compatible with
these precedents.”).
20
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993); Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 986 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
21
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531–32; Family Life Church, 561
F. Supp. 2d at 986.
22
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
23
See Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable Laws
and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2000); see also Ashira Pelman
Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 717, 745 (2008) (noting that “the Supreme Court has not explicitly provided a standard by which to distinguish between laws of general applicability and
individualized assessments”).
24
Compare Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d
1056, 1072–73 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding that regardless of RLUIPA the court could
review the city’s denial of a special zoning permit based on system of individualized
exemptions under strict scrutiny), Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879,
886 (D. Md. 1996) (finding the compelling interest test under Smith applied to a his-
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Additionally, Smith created the “hybrid situation,” which posits
that an alleged free exercise violation must be combined with an alleged violation of another constitutional right to invalidate a neutral
25
and generally applicable law. In dictum, Justice Scalia wrote that up
until Smith, the Court had only upheld a challenge to a neutral and
generally applicable law based on a religious belief when the case involved a claim under both the Free Exercise Clause and another constitutionally recognized right—historically, either a free speech or pa26
rental right. Two constitutional rights—each alone not enough to
overturn a law—may be sufficient when combined together to obtain
27
higher judicial scrutiny to invalidate the law. While the parties in
Smith never raised this argument, Justice Scalia’s dictum is often re28
lied upon in free exercise cases.
The Court applied the Smith test in Church of the Lukumi Babalu
29
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, finding that a city’s ordinance prohibiting ritual
animal sacrifices was not neutral and generally applicable and could
toric preservation ordinance that created a system of individualized exemptions), and
Alpine Christian Fellowship v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 870 F. Supp. 991, 993–94 (D. Colo.
1994) (reviewing the city’s denial of a zoning permit to a church under strict scrutiny), with Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 764 (7th
Cir. 2003) (finding that because everyone seeking a special zoning permit was subjected to the same process and no discriminatory means were used by the zoning
board, the zoning permit process was not one of individualized exemptions), and
Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass’n v. City of Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 403 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that the zoning ordinance was a neutral and generally applicable law under Smith
where plaintiff challenged the rezoning request).
25
See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82
(1990).
26
See id. at 881.
The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free
exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right. Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not
only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now.
Id. at 882.
27
See Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Life Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 857 (2001).
The mechanics of the hybrid theory work something like this: neither
free exercise nor parental rights standing alone can reach the results in
[Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)], but somehow when the two
claims are ‘hybridized’ or linked together they can do the work. Thus,
two insufficient constitutional interests—when combined—equal one
sufficient hybrid claim.
Id.
28
See id. at 858; Ira C. Lupu, Comment, Employment Division v. Smith and the
Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 267 (1993).
29
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).

STOUT_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

2/9/2011 9:04 AM

471

COMMENT
30

not survive strict scrutiny. The Court found that the local government enacted the ordinance specifically to prohibit the church from
practicing animal sacrifices and not for the health and safety reasons
31
that the government had presented.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter attacked Smith and the
hybrid method, stating “[i]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which
another constitutional right is implicated, then the hybrid exception
32
would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith [test].” The petitioner would only have to pair two rights together to obtain strict
33
scrutiny under the Smith test, even if the law burdening religious exercise is neutral and generally applicable. Justice Souter pointed out,
however, that there would be no reason to pair free exercise and
another right, if the plaintiff could win solely on the basis of the right
34
paired with free exercise.
B. Congressional Response to Smith
35

The Smith ruling sparked criticism from all sides. In an effort
to undo Smith, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
36
Act (RFRA) in 1993. RFRA reinstated strict scrutiny for cases where

30

See id. at 547.
Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes
apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these
requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest
and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. These ordinances fail to satisfy the Smith requirements.
Id. at 531–32.
31
See id. at 545.
32
Id. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
33
See id.
34
See id.
35
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544–45 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Smith was wrongly decided); 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7777 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (citing a letter
from Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion stating that there are “continuing
sources of free exercise problems in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Employment Division v. Smith”); 139 CONG. REC. H2356 (daily ed. May 11, 1993)
(statement of Rep. Brooks) (“The Supreme Court’s decision 3 years ago transformed
a most hallowed liberty into a mundane concept with little more status than a fishing
license-thus subjecting religious freedom to the whims of Government officials. . . .
Passage of this legislation is the only means to restore substance to the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.”).
36
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (2006). The statute states, in part, the following:
(a) The Congress finds that—
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the government has “substantially burdened a person’s free exercise
of religion” even if the burden results from neutral and generally ap37
plicable government actions or laws.
RFRA, however, had its own critics. Professor Ira Lupu suggested that RFRA may not have produced the intended benefits after
38
all.
Ultimately, the Act was unsuccessful, resulting in far fewer
39
grants of relief than denials under it. Its application also demon(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First
Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as
surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court
rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.
Id.
37

§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b). The act states, in part, the following:
(a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to
the person—
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

Id.
38
See Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 586
(1998) (“Moreover, the world of RFRA may have been filled with barely visible benefits, included increased bargaining leverage for religious interests and an increased
feeling of security among the deeply religious, as well as hard-to-calculate costs, including social resentment over particular RFRA claims and the civic stresses caused
by the necessity to defend against them.”). For another critique of RFRA, see Amy
Adamczyk et al., Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA, 46 J. CHURCH & STATE 237
(2004).
39
Professor Lupu observed that:
We will never know how many RFRA victories these cases might have
produced had [City of Boerne v. Flores] not terminated their RFRA
claims, as it did for all cases involving state law (i.e., the huge majority
of them). But we do know that 143 of the 168 produced denials of relief, only twenty-five claims produced grants of relief (for an overall win
percentage of 15% of cases decided on the merits), and that nine of
these twenty-five were in prisoner litigation, which typically involved
the most basic infringements of religious liberty.
Lupu, supra note 38, at 591.
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strated that judges are uncomfortable exempting religion from the
40
law, for fear of religious favoritism or a “slippery slope.” In 1997, the
Court invalidated RFRA as an unconstitutional use of congressional
41
enforcement power. The decision rendered the statute inapplicable
to state government action but held that it still applied to federal
government action.
Nevertheless, Congress enacted another law, RLUIPA, in an at42
tempt to protect religious freedom. RLUIPA created a safeguard for
religious institutions previously unable to combat generally applicable land-use regulations. The statute prohibits governments from
enacting “a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious
assembly or institution” unless the government acts to further a com43
pelling government interest using the least restrictive means.
The Act was intended to eliminate the distinction between discriminatory laws and laws of general and neutral applicability in the
44
context of land-use regulations.
Congress gave the Act a broad

40

See id. at 593.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997); see also Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 n.1 (2006) (“As
originally enacted, RFRA applied to States as well as the Federal Government. In City
of Boerne v. Flores, we held the application to States to be beyond Congress’ legislative
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (internal citations omitted)).
42
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
43
§ 2000cc(a)(1). The act states:
(a) Substantial burdens.
(1) No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person, assembly, or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
Id.
44
See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7774 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
Churches in general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes
and also in the highly individualized and discretionary processes of
land use regulation. Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in
places where they permit theaters, meeting halls, and other places
where large groups of people assemble for secular purposes. Or the
codes permit churches only with individualized permission from the
zoning board, and zoning boards use that authority in discriminatory
ways.
41
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scope and application to protect free exercise of religion. The Act
defines “religious exercise” expansively as “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious be46
lief,” eliminating any requirement of showing that the practice is
47
necessary to the religion. For religious institutions seeking to provide homeless services, this provision is important because the religious activity need not be a required practice for all members of the
religion. The statute also does not require any pairing of rights to
48
obtain strict scrutiny as Smith contemplated.
III. CURRENT CONFLICTS IN RELIGIOUS LAND USE:
USING PROPERTY FOR HOMELESS SERVICES
Courts have had to adapt to the changes in religious-land-use law
quickly, but courts are also struggling as churches seek to expand
their presence and become active in the community. Temporary
homeless shelters, often termed “tent cities,” present one of these
challenges. The shelters, which are set up temporarily on church
property and often run by a secular organization, present a challenge
for courts in applying religious-land-use laws and ultimately reveal
flaws in the standards governing religious land use. Because the circumstances of tent cities are so unique, courts are given an opportunity to clarify the reach of the present law.

Id.; see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005) (“RLUIPA is the latest of
long-running congressional efforts to accord religious exercise heightened protection from government-imposed burdens, consistent with this Court’s precedents.”);
David L. Abney, Religion and Housing for the Homeless, Using the First Amendment and the
Religious Land Use Act to Convert Religious Faith into Safe, Affordable Housing, 8 SCHOLAR
1, 10 (2005).
45
See § 2000cc-3(g) (“This Act shall be construed in favor of a broad protection
of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act and
the Constitution.”).
46
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A).
47
See, e.g., Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1239
(E.D. Va. 1996) (requiring plaintiff church to show “that it was central to their faith
to invite the homeless into the church in order to establish a climate of worship”).
But see Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1032 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009) (“Even assuming the [city] prohibited homeless shelters outright on
RH-zoned property, Westgate would still fail to prove a substantial burden [under
RLUIPA], because it did not show that running a homeless shelter at its specific location was fundamental to its religious exercise.”), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla.
App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009).
48
See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82
(1990).
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A. Finding Help in Religion
When homeless populations rise, cities—often faced with complaints and without the resources to solve the homelessness problem—have created statutes, such as anti-camping or sleeping and
49
panhandling statutes, to keep order in the community. In many instances homeless people sleeping on public property become subject
to police “sweeps” in which officers strictly enforce these laws, rather
50
than solely in instances of specific complaints. Courts have typically
upheld these laws against legal challenges because of public health
51
and safety concerns, deferring to city governments.
The statutes, however, only temporarily disperse the homeless,
52
especially when shelters become overcrowded. While it seems that
cities, both large and small, contain several places for the homeless to
take shelter during the days and nights, these shelters often are not
located near schools, shopping, government-aid programs, or other
services the homeless need and do not provide access to reliable
53
transportation to get them to these locations. Even if shelters are
available, at least one court has recognized that many homeless

49

See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding a city ordinance prohibiting camping on public property); see also Roulette v. City
of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding a city ordinance prohibiting
sitting or lying on public sidewalks around commercial areas); ATLANTA, GA., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 43-1 (2009) (prohibiting solicitation of money in certain public areas);
CLEVELAND, OH., CODE § 605.031 (2009) (prohibiting repeated solicitations after a
person first refuses); CINCINNATI, OH., CODE § 910-12 (2009) (prohibiting solicitation
of money in certain public areas).
50
See, e.g., Paul Shockley, Ex-Officers Defend Raid, DAILY SENTINEL (Grand Junction,
Co.)
(June
21,
2010),
http://www.gjsentinel.com/news/articles/
exofficers_defend_raid; Michelle Smith, R.I. Tent City Residents Forced to Move, LEDGER
(Lakeland,
Fla.)
Sept.
6,
2009,
at
A2,
available
at
http://www.theledger.com/article/20090905/news/909055050; Susan Poag, Homeless
Sweep
Under
Expressway,
TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Sept.
1,
2009),
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/09/homeless_sweep.html; Mike Carter
and Drew DeSilver, Dozens Protest Homeless Sweeps with City Hall Camp-Out, SEATTLE
TIMES (June 9, 2008), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/
2004466035_homeless09m.html.
51
See Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d at 1362 (upholding a city ordinance prohibiting camping on public property); Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d at 306
(upholding a city ordinance prohibiting sitting or lying on public sidewalks around
commercial areas); Ulmer v. Mun. Ct., 127 Cal. Rptr. 445, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(upholding a statute prohibiting the solicitation of funds without a permit against a
First Amendment challenge).
52
St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935, 939
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (observing that when homeless shelters are closed,
homeless individuals are forced to return to the streets).
53
See Abney, supra note 44, at 2.
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people “are ‘service resistant,’ and would be as unlikely to stay in an
54
indoor church shelter as in a City shelter.”
Churches can offer a solution to these problems by permitting
homeless shelters on property protected by RLUIPA and the Free
Exercise Clause. While many churches organize and manage homeless shelters, increasingly the homeless have organized into secular
camps, asking churches for temporary use of their land to set up a
55
camp undisturbed by police. These tent cities have appeared all
over the country, including Columbus, Ohio; Athens, Georgia; Cha56
tanooga, Tennessee; Seattle, Washington; and Ontario, California.
Groups of around 100 homeless people organize most tent cities and
57
become a mobilized community. Host churches and other donors
58
often provide meals, portable restrooms, and other services.
B. Local Governments’ Police Power to Regulate
Many cities have resisted the alliance between homeless camps
and religious institutions. Using zoning laws, public-nuisance laws,
and the public interest in health and safety, cities and residents have
59
challenged homeless encampments on church properties. Zoning
regulations permit cities to section off land for certain uses in the in54
Fifth Ave. Presbyterian v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 11493, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22185, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004).
55
See generally Tent Cities, SEATTLE HOUSING AND RESOURCE EFFORT/WOMEN’S
HOUSING AND EQUALITY LEAGUE (SHARE/WHEEL), http://www.sharewheel.org/
Home/tent-cities (last visited Jan. 12, 2011) [hereinafter SHARE/WHEEL]; PINELLAS
HOPE, http://www.pinellashope.org (last visited Jan. 14, 2010); Melanie C. Johnson,
Tent City in Ontario Offers Shelter, Services, PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Dec. 28,
2007,
at
B1, available
at
http://www.pe.com/localnews/inland/stories/
PE_News_Local_D_tentcity28.2915a96.html; Dave Askins, Laws of Physics: Homeless
Camp Moves, ANN ARBOR CHRON. (Sept. 2, 2009), http://annarborchronicle.com/
2009/09/02/laws-of-physics-homeless-camp-moves.
56
See Evelyn Nieves, In Hard Times, Tent Cities Rise Across the Country, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Sept. 18, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-09-183933748920_x.htm. “The phenomenon of encampments has caught advocacy
groups somewhat by surprise, largely because of how quickly they have sprung up.”
Id.
57
See SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55; see also PINELLAS HOPE, supra note 55.
58
See id.
59
See, e.g., Don Mann, Tent City 4 Coming Again to Woodinville, WOODINVILLE WKLY.
(June 21, 2010), http://www.nwnews.com/index.php?id=1569:tent-city-4-comingagain-to-woodinville&option=com_content&catid=34:news&Itemid=72; Mercer Island
Residents Look to Stop Tent City in Court, MERCER ISLAND REP. (July 16, 2008),
http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/east_king/mir/news/28076489.html; see also Chandra Broadwater, Hillsborough Officials’ Sudden Interest in Homeless Camp Riles Opponents,
ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (July 22, 2009), http://www.tampabay.com/news/
growth/article1020464.ece.
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terest of public health and safety. Most churches exist in residential
60
zones that tend to have strict regulations on the use of the land.
Some zoning ordinances directly limit meal or housing programs for
61
62
the homeless; others require conditional use permits or semi63
public use permits to host these programs. For the larger outdoor
camps, most cities—if they do not prohibit the encampment out64
Allowing
right—require churches to obtain temporary permits.
churches to host homeless shelters and homeless service programs,
however, can disrupt zoning purposes—the more variances and conditional permits granted, the more distorted zoning plans become.
Because of the public health and safety concerns that zoning is
designed to protect, homeless programs face much opposition. Cities
have been reluctant to grant permits for housing and meal programs
because these programs bring outsiders into communities, which can
65
cause problems. Although some homeless individuals are simply
persons who have been victims of bad financial luck, many others are
ex-offenders, parolees, mentally handicapped, or alcohol or drug ab66
users. Tent cities pose an additional difficulty. The camps can con60

See Shelley Rose Saxer, When Religion Becomes a Nuisance: Balancing Land Use and
Religious Freedom When Activities of Religious Institutions Bring Outsiders into the Neighborhood, 84 KY. L.J. 507, 526 (1995).
61
See, e.g., Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1228
(E.D. Va. 1996) (concerning zoning code limiting feeding programs to thirty individuals for seven days in a six month period); Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of
Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D.D.C. 1994) (concerning a statute regulating programs conducted by churches in residential zones such as feeding programs).
62
See, e.g., Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1029
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (regarding a conditional use permit to operate a homeless
shelter), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009);
Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (regarding the application for a conditional use permit to operate a homeless shelter).
63
See, e.g., Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp.
1554, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (concerning an application for a semi-public use permit
to house homeless).
64
See, e.g., City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 P.3d
406, 408 (Wash. 2009) (concerning the attainment of a temporary use permit to host
a tent city on church property); Tent City—Temporary Homeless Encampments, MUN.
RESEARCH AND SERVS. CTR. OF WASH., http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Housing/
tentcity/tentcity.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) (listing permits required for Washington cities).
65
See generally Saxer, supra note 60 (discussing the conflict between city residents
and religious programs that serve nonresidents).
66
See Damien Cave and Lynn Waddell, ‘Tent City’ of Homeless Is Rejected in Florida,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/10/14/us/14homeless.html; Evelyn Nieves, supra note 56; Jennifer Levitz, Cities
Tolerate Homeless Camps, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2009, at A3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124994409537920819.html; see also Jennifer Lebo-
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tain over 100 people, all housed outdoors, without the support of
67
twenty-four hour staff that a homeless shelter provides. The camps,
however, are usually temporary and move from location to location
every few months in an effort to ease the concerns that arise in each
68
community. Despite their impermanence, many cities have refused
69
to allow churches to host any kind of homeless camp. In some cases
the residents file suit or petition the local government to stop
70
churches from hosting tent cities.
C. The Shelter Cases
While RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause have given religious
institutions an advantage over other property owners wishing to conduct programs for the homeless on their property, religious institutions still must overcome a difficult burden with any religious-landuse test: Smith, RFRA, or RLUIPA. Churches have long fought against
local zoning ordinances prohibiting shelters and large meal minisvich, Miami Threatens to Fine State over Sex-Offender Camp, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 7,
2009),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/southflorida/story/1175176.html?
storylink=mirelated.
67
See SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55; PINELLAS HOPE, supra note 55; see also Jennifer Levitz, supra note 66.
68
See SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55; Nicole Tsong, Belle’s First United Methodist
Seeks Permit to Host Tent City, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/bellevueblog/2009701487_firstunitedmeth
odistappliesfortentcity4permit.
html.
69
See Steve Bauer, Champaign Official: Court Proper Arena for Tent City Fight, NEWS(Aug.
29,
2009),
http://www.newsgazette.com/news/politics/
GAZETTE,
2009/08/29/champaign_official_court_proper_arena_for_tent_city_fight
(city
would only permit tent city group of homeless persons if the church housed them in
a semi-permanent structure); Damien Cave and Lynn Waddell, supra note 66 (County Commission rejected permanent “Tent City” hosted on land owned by the Catholic church in Tampa); see also City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of
Christ, 211 P.3d 406, 408 (Wash. 2009) (city refused to consider temporary use permit application for church to host tent city for a three month period); City of Bothell
v. Catholic Archbishop of Seattle, No. 04-2-11578 SEA (WA King County Super. Ct.,
June 10, 2004), http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Housing/tentcity/tentcity.aspx (denying a city’s preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin a church from continuing to
host a tent city); Nicole Tsong, Clergy Dispute Mercer Island’s Tent City Rules, SEATTLE
TIMES,(Apr,
2,
2010),
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/
2011347755_mercertent15m.html. But see An Act Relating to the Housing of Homeless Persons of Property Owned or Controlled by a Church, ch. 36.01, sec. 2, § (1)–
(2)(a), 2010 ESHB 1956 (Wash.) (enacting a law in Washington State that now permits religious organizations to host tent cities but also permits local governments to
regulate so long as the regulation does not impose a substantial burden on the religious organization and are necessary to protect public health and safety).
70
See Mercer Island Residents, supra note 59; see also Chandra Broadwater, supra
note 59.
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tries in the residential zones where most churches are located. These
cases, however, only offer a history of confused application of the various free exercise tests, producing conflicting results.
1.

Constitutional Analysis

A decade before Smith, the New Jersey Superior Court, in St.
John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, articulated one of
71
the broadest approaches taken towards the Free Exercise right. The
case involved a city’s challenge to a church-run homeless shelter in
72
the basement of the church. In upholding the church’s right to
sponsor the homeless shelter against local zoning ordinances, the
New Jersey Superior Court explained the importance of churches
hosting these programs; for centuries, sheltering the homeless was a
73
religious activity that benefited communities. The court concluded
that churches should not be required to meet the same health and
74
safety standards as commercial establishments such as hotels. After
Smith, however, courts began paying less attention to the religious
freedom of churches to run beneficial homeless programs for the
community and instead have become more deferential to city zoning
practices.
Many courts have denied relief to churches that do not follow
applicable code procedures, either by failing to apply for a permit or
75
failing to fix building and fire code violations. For example, in First
Assembly of God v. Collier County, the city charged the church with violating several zoning ordinances and denied the church an acces76
sory-use permit to run a homeless shelter. The court found the zoning ordinances neutral and generally applicable; it noted that the

71

See St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
72
See id. at 937.
73
See id.
74
See id. at 939.
75
See, e.g., First Assembly of God v. Collier Cnty., 20 F.3d 419 (11th Cir. 1994)
(denying relief to a church that operated a homeless shelter in violation local zoning
and building codes); Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 982
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (denying relief for a church that operated a homeless shelter in
without a required permit and later denied a permit when it failed to correct building code violations); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027,
1032–33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (denying relief to a church who failed to acquire a
permit to operate a homeless shelter), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App.
LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009).
76
20 F.3d 419, 420 (11th Cir. 1994).
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city’s interests in health and safety outweighed the burden on the
77
church to relocate the shelter to a place zoned for such usage.
Although courts are deferential to city zoning procedures and
regulations, they have been less willing to uphold excessive restrictions on homeless shelters and meal programs under the Free Exer78
cise Clause. In First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, a religious congregation of homeless people that conducted group meals
and religious services weekly in a city park challenged an ordinance
requiring a permit for these gatherings and limiting those permits to
79
two per year. The court agreed with the church’s assertion that the
city violated its congregation’s free exercise rights and freedom of as80
sembly rights. Using the Smith test, the court first determined that
the statute was neutral and generally applicable, as it applied to all
81
permit seekers alike. Then the court applied rational basis review
but found that even under this deferential standard, the city had no
legitimate interest in implementing an ordinance that so greatly re82
stricted the religious practice.
Echoes of St. John’s, however, still resonate in some cases. In
Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, the Western
Presbyterian Church operated a meal program in its church for
83
homeless persons. When the church and its program moved to
another location, the city refused to let it continue its service and de84
nied the church a zoning variance. The court awarded a preliminary injunction to the church, preventing the city from shutting
down the homeless shelter because the court found no justifiable interest in restricting homeless services to certain areas of the city un85
der the Smith test and RFRA. The court noted that “by requiring the
77
Id. at 423–24. The court cites to a three-factor test to determine if zoning laws
violate the Free Exercise Clause used prior to Smith: “First, the government regulation must regulate religious conduct, not belief. Second, the law must have a secular
purpose and a secular effect. Third, once these two thresholds are crossed, the court
engages in a balancing of competing governmental and religious interests.” Id. at
424 (citing Grosz v. Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 733 (11th Cir. 1983)).
78
See, e.g., First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d
1353 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp.
1225, 1239–40 (E.D. Va. 1996).
79
See First Vagabonds Church of God, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1357–58.
80
See id. at 1361–62. Another party to the case raised a free speech claim, which
the court found was violated. Id. at 1361.
81
See id. at 1361–62.
82
See id. at 1362.
83
See 849 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D.D.C. 1994).
84
See id.
85
See id. at 78–79.

STOUT_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

COMMENT

2/9/2011 9:04 AM

481

Church peremptorily to discontinue an important social welfare and
religious program that has been in existence for over 10 years consti86
tutes irreparable injury.”
Another court was similarly deferential to a church in Fifth Ave87
nue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York. The church permitted
88
homeless people to sleep on the steps of the church’s entrance.
Two years later, the city told the church that it would not permit the
homeless to sleep there, and police came and removed persons sleep89
ing on the steps during the night. The court found that RLUIPA
did not apply because the church was conducting a religious exercise
that constituted a proper accessory use of its property; the city did not
prohibit persons from sleeping on church property but used public
90
nuisance laws to force them off the property. Using the Smith test,
the court rejected the city’s argument that the substantial burden on
the church’s religious exercise could be eliminated through the use
of an indoor shelter; instead, the court suggested that the judiciary
should not become involved in an inquiry about whether a substantial
burden could be eliminated through other means while still respect91
ing religious exercise. After finding the city did not fairly enforce its
neutral and generally applicable laws, the court applied strict scruti92
ny. The court found that the city’s actions were not narrowly tailored because the police enforced the local laws under-inclusively and
over-inclusively—arresting all persons on the property in that specific
93
area of the city if just one person violated the law.
2.

Analysis under RFRA

Arguably, RFRA provided the most expansive support for religious institutions by reinstating heightened scrutiny for any substan94
tial burden on a religious exercise. Yet even this favorable approach
86

Id. at 79.
See No. 01 Civ. 11493, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2004),
aff’d 177 F. App’x 198 (2d Cir. 2006).
88
Id. at *2.
89
Id. at *3.
90
Id. at *13–15.
91
See id. at *8–10. “Adopting defendant’s approach would subject plaintiffs to a
far higher standard than is required by the Second Circuit’s directive that demonstrating a substantial burden is not a particularly onerous task. A limited judicial inquiry is necessary because it respects the danger of under judicial involvement in religious activity.” Id. at *9–10 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
92
See id. at *12–14, *39.
93
See Fifth Ave. Presbyterian, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22185 at *12–14, *39.
94
See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2006).
87
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to churches produces mixed results. In Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v.
City of Daytona, a religious non-profit organization, Daytona Rescue
Mission, Inc., brought suit against the city of Daytona under RFRA
and the Florida version of RFRA after the city refused to allow a
95
homeless shelter on the church’s newly acquired property. Unlike
the court in Western Presbyterian, the district court found no substantial
burden because the church failed to show that the zoning code prohibited it from hosting a shelter or other homeless program any96
where within the city’s limits. The court found that the city, in drafting its zoning ordinances, had a compelling interest in regulating
homeless shelters and food banks, and the zoning regulations in the
97
city code constituted the least restrictive means. The church, therefore, had to buy other land in a zone that allowed such uses in order
98
to construct a homeless shelter.
As applied to more restrictive zoning regulations, however, the
statute works to favor religious institutions. Stuart Circle Parish challenged a local zoning ordinance that limited meal and housing programs for the homeless to only seven days within a seven-month pe99
riod and to no more than thirty persons. The church served meals
100
every Sunday as part of its worship service. Under RFRA, the court
found that making the church spread out its meal ministry throughout its six churches to fit within the zoning statute would be too much
101
of a burden. The city failed to show that it had a compelling state
interest that would justify the restrictions placed on the church;
102
neighborhood complaints were not enough. Still, this higher standard of scrutiny under RFRA may not be necessary for these cases because the more restrictive local ordinances on land use will likely be
unable to pass rational basis review as articulated in First Vagabonds
103
Church above.

95

See 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1555–56 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
Id. at 1560.
97
Id.
98
See id.
99
See Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D.
Va. 1996).
100
Id.
101
See id. at 1238–39.
102
See id. at 1239.
103
See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1353,
1361–62 (M.D. Fla. 2008).
96
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Analysis under RLUIPA

After the Court invalidated RFRA as it applies to the states, Congress enacted a similar statute but restricted its application to religious land use and the Free Exercise rights of institutionalized per104
sons.
By mandating a strict scrutiny standard for substantial
burdens on religious land use, RLUIPA was, in part, intended to protect religious land use against zoning ordinances that unduly restrict
105
religious exercise.
For churches challenging local zoning ordinances, so that congregations may organize a homeless shelter, this is a
difficult standard to meet because of the deference given to local zoning boards and the notion that running a homeless shelter is not a
necessary religious practice.
In May 2009, the Florida Court of Appeals denied a church’s
free exercise claim under RLUIPA where the church refused to apply
for a permit for its homeless shelter and incurred fines for continu106
ing operations.
Narrowing the application of the Free Exercise
Clause, the court found that the church failed to show a substantial
burden “because it did not show that running a homeless shelter at
107
its specific location was fundamental to its religious exercise” —a
108
requirement not listed in the statute. In addition, the court noted
that a church must also exhaust all administrative remedies before
109
bringing a claim.
Similarly, Family Life Church was denied relief for operating a
110
homeless shelter in violation of zoning laws.
The church also
111
needed a conditional use permit to continue providing services.
When the church filed for the permit, inspectors found 105 violations
104

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006).
See 146 CONG. REC. S 7774 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen.
Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) (stating a need for the legislation because “[c]hurches in
general, and new, small, or unfamiliar churches in particular, are frequently discriminated against on the face of zoning codes and also in the highly individualized and
discretionary processes of land use regulation”).
106
See Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1029–30
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352
(Aug. 13, 2009). The church also brought a claim under the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but the court stated the same analysis is used under RLUIPA.
Id. at 1030.
107
Id. at 1032.
108
See § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”).
109
See Westgate Tabernacle, 14 So. 3d at 1032.
110
See Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 981 (N.D. Ill.
2008).
111
See id.
105
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112

of the city codes. After an eight-month application process, the city
113
denied the church’s application.
The court found no substantial
burden on religious exercise; a delay in the permit process and other
regulations for the operation of a shelter were only incidental bur114
dens.
D. Conflicting Precedent
Within these cases, courts have ruled consistently where certain
fact patterns are involved. If a church fails to utilize the zoning
process to address its grievance, as in First Assembly of God, Westgate Ta115
bernacle, and Family Life Church, courts will refuse relief. If the zoning regulations on land use are unnecessarily excessive, however,
courts are comfortable using Free Exercise to invalidate the statutes
116
as they apply to the church. Problems arise when a court must decide how to evaluate a substantial burden on religious exercise under
the religious-land-use tests. RLUIPA does not define substantial burden, but Congress articulated that it intended the definition to be in117
terpreted in light of Supreme Court precedent.

112

See id. at 983.
See id. at 987.
114
See id. at 987–88. The court stated, “[m]uch of the burden on Family Life was
self-imposed by its premature opening of the shelter before seeking a permit.” Id. at
988.
115
See, e.g., First Assembly of God v. Collier Cnty., 20 F.3d 419, 424 (11th Cir.
1994); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1031–32 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2009), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug.
13, 2009); Family Life Church, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 988.
116
See, e.g., First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 578 F. Supp. 2d
1353, 1357–58 (M.D. Fla. 2008); Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F.
Supp. 1225 (E.D. Va. 1996).
117
See 146 CONG. REC. S7774, 7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Sen. Hatch, Sen. Kennedy, and Sen. Reid) (“The Act does not include a definition of
the term ‘substantial burden’ because it is not the intent of this Act to create a new
standard for the definition of ‘substantial burden’ on religious exercise. Instead,
that term as used in the Act should be interpreted by reference to Supreme Court
jurisprudence. . . . The term ‘substantial burden’ as used in this Act is not intended
to be given any broader interpretation than the Supreme Court’s articulation of the
concept of substantial burden or religious exercise.”); see also Westchester Day Sch. v.
Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Since substantial burden is a
term of art in the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, we assume that Congress, by using it, planned to incorporate the cluster of ideas associated with the
Court’s use of it.”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1226
(11th Cir. 2004) (“The Supreme Court’s definition of ‘substantial burden’ within its
free exercise cases is instructive in determining what Congress understood ‘substantial burden’ to mean in RLUIPA.”).
113
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The Supreme Court, however, has offered little help in this area.
Years before the enactment of RFRA and RLUIPA, the Court defined
substantial burden as “[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or
where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to
118
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
Read broadly—as RLUIPA intends the definition of substantial
119
burden —this definition protects free exercise by requiring only a
showing of pressure to modify, but not an actual violation of, one’s
beliefs to establish a substantial burden. In interpreting RLUIPA and
the Free Exercise Clause under Smith, the circuit courts have drawn
from this earlier definition but have failed to come to a consensus on
a proper definition in the religious-land-use cases.
The First, Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have taken part of
the Supreme Court’s definition, holding that a substantial burden exists “when the government put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent
120
to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” The Seventh Circuit, which the Northern District of Illinois was bound to follow in
Family Life Church, also added that the government action “necessarily
bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering
121
religious exercise . . . effectively impracticable.”
The Fifth Circuit follows a similar but more stringent definition—that the person must “significantly modify” his behavior and vi122
olate his beliefs.
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits take different
118

Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007) (With RLUIPA,
“Congress intended to create a broad definition of substantial burden.”).
120
Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987)); see Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718 (A substantial burden exists when the government is “putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”); see also Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272,
280 (3d Cir. 2007) (The Third Circuit also accepts a showing that “a follower is
forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other[s] . . . versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit.”); Spratt v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 482
F.3d 33, 38 (1st Cir. 2007); Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006).
121
Vision Church, 468 F.3d at 997 (citing Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City
of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003)); Family Life Church v. City of Elgin,
561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 987 (N.D. Ill. 2008). The Seventh Circuit cites to both the Supreme Court definition in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S.
136, 141 (1987) and the definition in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 342 F.3d at 761.
122
Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that substantial
burden “truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior
119
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approaches under RLUIPA, defining substantial burden as a “signifi123
124
cant” restriction or pressure.
This pressure must be “great” or
125
“tend[] to force adherents to forego religious precepts.”
The Second Circuit has reasoned that because the Supreme
Court held that “generally applicable burdens, neutrally applied are
126
not ‘substantial,’” the court will look at additional factors to determine whether a substantial burden exists, including whether the
church had “quick, reliable, and financially feasible alternatives” and
127
whether the zoning decision was conditional or absolute. Following
Second Circuit precedent, the court in Fifth Avenue Presbyterian added
that finding a substantial burden is “not a particularly onerous
128
task.”
These inconsistent definitions of substantial burden have
created a spectrum of government actions that constitute a substantial burden. For example, the Second Circuit found a substantial
burden where a village denied the zoning application of a Jewish day
school that wished to expand on its own land to meet its growing
needs because no quick and financially feasible alternatives for the
129
school existed, and the denial was absolute.
The Seventh Circuit,
however, found no substantial burden when a village put restrictions
on the size of a church and the religious activities that a church could

and significantly violates his religious beliefs”). The Fifth Circuit clarified that “significant” means “it either (1) influences the adherent to act in a way that violates his
religious beliefs, or (2) forces the adherent to choose between, on the one hand, enjoying some generally available, non-trivial benefit, and, on the other hand, following
his religious beliefs.” Id.
123
See San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th
Cir. 2004) (defining substantial burden as “a significantly great restriction or onus
upon such exercise”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214,
1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining substantial burden under RLUIPA as “significant
pressure which directly coerces the religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly”).
124
San Jose Christian Coll., 360 F.3d at 1034 (defining substantial burden as “a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise”).
125
Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1227.
126
Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir. 2007)
(citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389–91
(1990)).
127
Id. at 352.
128
Fifth Ave. Presbyterian Church v. City of New York, No. 01–11493, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22185, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2004) (citing McEachin v. McGuinnis,
357 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2004)).
129
See Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352–53.
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hold because the restrictions were “merely incidental” and did not
130
render the practice effectively impracticable.
The different ways of approaching what constitutes a substantial
burden have contributed to the contradictory results of the shelter
cases, including the conflicting results in Western Presbyterian and Day131
tona Rescue Mission. The court in Western Presbyterian concluded that
the church met the substantial burden requirement by showing that
132
serving the homeless is an integral part of its faith; however, the
court in Daytona Rescue Mission explicitly rejected the same argument
133
and proposed a more stringent standard for substantial burden. As
long as the church could serve the homeless anywhere in the city limits, the absolute denial to do so in a specific location was not a sub134
stantial burden.
The danger in the various substantial burden tests concerns how
many exceptions to neutral and generally applicable laws courts
should afford religious institutions. By granting many exemptions,
courts run the risk of a slippery slope that opens the door too wide
for religious freedom—to the point that the court may begin to allow
certain activities that would be impermissible if not for the cloak of
135
religion shielding churches from the government’s police power.
Church-hosted tent cities walk the fine line between these tests. In
many cases, the practice of hosting a tent city is not an indispensable
practice to the church, but it is part of a mission of the church to
136
serve others and help the community.
An outright denial to host
tent cities is too burdensome, but these tests offer different conclu-

130

Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 998–99 (7th Cir. 2006).
Compare Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona, 885 F. Supp. 1554,
1555–56 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (finding no substantial burden when city denied permit for
church to build a homeless shelter on newly acquired property), with Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77, 79 (D.D.C. 1994)
(finding a substantial burden when city denied permit for church to host homeless
feeding program at new church location).
132
See Western Presbyterian, 849 F. Supp. at 79.
133
See Daytona Rescue Mission, 885 F. Supp. at 1560.
134
See id.
135
See Lupu, supra note 38, at 593 (“Better no exemptions, they might well say,
than a pattern of exemptions riddled by religious favoritism.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 574 (1998) (“There no longer exists a plausible explanation of why religious believers- and only believers- are constitutionally entitled to be
excused from complying with otherwise legitimate laws that burden practices motivated by moral belief.”).
136
See Levitz, supra note 66; Tent City 4, LAKE WASH. UNITED METHODIST CHURCH,
http://www.lwumc.com/tentcityhtml (last visited Jan. 14, 2010).
131
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sions as to the extent of the burden that a city can place on the practice of hosting tent cities.
IV. THE DIFFICULTY IN ASSESSING CLAIMS OF
CHURCH-HOSTED TENT CITIES
The debate on the definition of substantial burden further affects religious institutions wishing to host tent cities on their property. While many municipal courts have arbitrated fights between
churches hosting tent cities and local governments, only one precedential case has emerged recently. The case, argued in the Washington state court system, advances a broader definition of a substantial
137
burden.
A. Lessons from Washington
The facts are similar to those of the shelter cases. In 2004, the
City of Woodinville, SHARE/WHEEL, and Northshore Church entered into a contract permitting a tent city to stay on church-owned
property for a three-month period, provided it obtained a valid tem138
porary-use permit.
As another host site withdrew for the May
through July months, Northshore agreed to apply quickly for a tem139
porary use permit to allow the camp to stay on its property. A few
months before the church applied, however, the city put a six-month
moratorium for sustainable development studies on all land use per140
mit applications in residential zones where the church was situated.
The city refused to process the application in light of the moratorium
and additionally refused to allow the tent city to camp outside the
141
areas covered by the moratorium. Northshore Church allowed the
142
tent city to use its property anyway, and the city brought suit. The
Washington Supreme Court held that the city’s refusal to process the
church’s requested permit on the basis of the moratorium violated
143
the Free Exercise Clause of the Washington State Constitution.
137
See City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 P.3d 406,
411 n.4 (Wash. 2009).
138
See id. at 408.
139
See id.
140
See id.
141
See id.
142
See id.
143
See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 411. The Washington State Constitution states:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment,
belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one
shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so con-
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While noting that the state’s protection of free exercise is broader than the protection granted in the federal Constitution, Justice
Johnson wrote that the church only needs to show that the government action substantially burdens a sincerely held religious belief the
144
church wishes to exercise. Because the city conceded that hosting
the tent city is part of the church’s free exercise, the issue of whether
providing for the homeless reflected a sincerely held religious belief
was not discussed, though the court noted that the church had not
145
engaged in this type of activity previously.
The case turned on
whether the city’s refusal to process the permit because of the mora146
This astorium substantially burdened the church’s free exercise.
sessment, according to Justice Johnson, requires the court to examine
the context of the burden and to “look at any alternatives the regula147
tion leaves open” —a test similar to the Second Circuit’s but without
the “substantial pressure” language or a second inquiry to determine
148
if the denial was conditional or absolute.
Accordingly, the court
149
found that refusing to process a permit was a substantial burden.
The Northshore case offered hope for churches—in Washington
at least—to expand tent city programs in their communities. But
does the Washington Supreme Court’s deferential approach to religious institutions go too far? The substantial burden standard articulated by the court considered the effect of the tent city on neighbors;
however, it found that this was better settled by reasonable city regu150
lations. Additionally, the city did not deny the permit outright but
merely delayed the process. The court, however, found this excuse
151
unavailing. Perhaps the city would have had a stronger case had it
fought the religious exercise issue because the church had never
strued as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent
with the peace and safety of the state.
WASH. CONST. art. I § 11.
144
See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 409–11.
145
See id. at 410.
146
See id.
147
Id. at 411 n.4. “For example . . . the Church conceded it would be possible to
house Tent City inside the Church. Worship traditionally takes place inside a church
and this alternative would obviate many of the neighbor/city legitimate concerns.
We make no decision on such a regulation because the City did not allow such alternative.” Id.
148
Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2007)
(requiring courts to look at financially feasible alternatives and whether the denial of
a permit was conditional or absolute).
149
See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 411.
150
See id.
151
See id.
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hosted a camp in the past, and thus this activity was not a central religious exercise of the church.
But this case may also represent undue judicial activism in a
struggling economy, a similar theme found both in St. John’s and
152
Western Presbyterian.
Professor William P. Marshall argues that
judges often do not give substantial weight to the state’s interest in a
given situation because it is unlikely that one exemption will threaten
153
that interest. Even so, the tent city in Northshore complicates judicial
assessment under the Free Exercise Clause or religious-land-use statute because other interests are involved, including public nuisance
154
and safety concerns due to the size of the camp. The church is not
just asking for an exemption to practice a specific religious ritual, like
the use of peyote; it is asking to do something that affects the entire
community.
B. How Church-Hosted Tent Cities Expose Flaws in Free Exercise
In Northshore the church met a complete ban on permit applica155
If a city ordinance is more narrowly tailored than that in
tions.
Northshore and bans outdoor camps in residential zones or refuses an
application for a temporary homeless camp out of concern for the
156
surrounding community, how should a court react? Tent cities are

152
See St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken, 479 A.2d 935
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp. 77 (D.D.C. 1994).
153
See William P. Marshall, Correspondence on Free Exercise Revisionism, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 312 (1991).
154
See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 411.
155
In fact, a year after Northshore was decided, the state of Washington passed a
law, which prohibits local governments from “impos[ing] conditions other than
those necessary to protect public health and safety and that do not substantially burden the decisions or actions of a religious organizations.” An Act Relating to the
Housing of Homeless Persons of Property Owned or Controlled by a Church, ch.
36.01, sec. 2, § (2)(a), 2010 ESHB 1956 (Wash.). This law, however, fails to solve the
definitional problem of the “substantial burden” language.
156
One editorial explains the conflict between neighbors and churches when a
church sought permission to use their land for a tent city:
Organizers of Hillsborough Cares tried to make their plan work with
generous buffer zones, a single entrance, a tall fence and setbacks even
wider than required for building a jail. They promised strict screening
of residents. They talked about police presence and brought off-duty
officers from Pinellas Hope who said reassuring things. They set a
maximum stay of 90 consecutive days. In short, they offered up everything but a drawbridge and a moat.
None of it was enough [for the city commission].
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unique. They offer a solution to problems of homelessness in communities and overcrowded shelters, yet they can be a real—although
often temporary—nuisance due to both their size and the fact that
they are located outdoors. These situations walk the fine line of religious freedom, but because of the unusual nature of tent cities,
RLUIPA and the Smith test provide no clear answers on which side of
the line these cases should fall.
1.

Substantial Burden on a Religious Exercise

Both RLUIPA and the Smith test require that the religious institution demonstrate a substantial burden on a religious exercise in
order to survive a claim. RLUIPA offers an expansive definition of
“religious exercise” but fails to define “substantial burden” in the sta157
tute, leaving it up to the courts to decide. Thus, courts have been
forced to rely on the varying circuit courts’ definitions when applying
158
either the Smith test or RLUIPA. But the facts surrounding tent cities present a more difficult issue.
Churches do not run, organize, or control tent cities; rather,
159
tent cities are a separate secular organization of homeless people.
Churches and other religious institutions cooperate with tent cities by
providing the property, monetary donations to maintain the camp,
160
and often meals on a daily basis. The religious exercise in these situations is unclear; should it be considered a meal ministry, or can
Sue Carlton, Tent City Plans Die but Hope Shouldn’t, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 14,
2009, at B1, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/humaninterest/tent-cityplans-die-but-hope-shouldnt/1043722.
157
“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)
(2006).
158
See, e.g., Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006)
(defining substantial burden as “when the government put[s] ‘substantial pressure
on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs’” (quoting Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987))); Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining
substantial burden under RLUIPA as “significant pressure which directly coerces the
religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly”); San Jose Christian
Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining substantial
burden as “a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise”). But see
Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 352 (2d Cir. 2007) (looking at additional factors to determine a substantial burden including whether the
church had “quick, reliable, and financially feasible alternatives” and whether the
zoning decision was conditional).
159
See Levitz, supra note 66; SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55.
160
See Levitz, supra note 66; Tsong, supra note 68; Debera Carlton Harrell, Ballard
Hosts Tent City, SEATTLE P-I (Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/
353338_ballard01.html; see also Mann, supra note 59.
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camp-hosting be characterized as a religious exercise? If courts are
unable to determine the religious exercise in question, they will be
unable to determine whether the government’s actions substantially
burden that exercise.
Although tent cities have been present throughout history,
161
church-hosted tent cities are a relatively new phenomenon.
Most
churches have never hosted tent cities, or even housed or fed the
162
homeless on their property.
In St. John’s, Western Presbyterian, and
Stuart Circle Parish, the courts took the history of hosting homeless
163
And the Washington Suprograms at the church into account.
preme Court in Northshore commented that the church had never be164
fore engaged in any homeless services, let alone hosting a tent city.
Churches starting new ministries, such as those wanting to host
homeless shelters, may have difficulty showing the city’s denial of a
permit is a substantial burden.
Additionally, many of these churches host these camps tempora165
rily.
While this weakens the government’s nuisance claim, courts
may not view this temporary activity, one that could be done yearround and more substantially, as an important religious practice or as
a valid religious exercise under the Smith test. The RLUIPA statute
offers a broader definition of religious exercise—exercise that does
166
not have to be central to or compelled by the religious belief.
Courts in general are deferential to churches when making a finding
167
as to whether the religious belief is valid, and in some cases, like

161

See Evelyn Nieves, supra note 56.
See generally City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211
P.3d 406, 410 (Wash. 2009) (“There is no issue raised here of whether hosting Tent
City is important or central to the Church’s exercise (though the Church has never
before engaged in such practice around or in its church).”); Jennifer Levitz, supra
note 63; Tsong, supra note 68; Debera Carlton Harrell, supra note 160.
163
See Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1239 (E.D.
Va. 1996); Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 849 F. Supp.
77, 79 (D.D.C. 1994); St. John’s Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City of Hoboken,
479 A.2d 935, 939 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
164
Northshore, 211 P.3d at 410 (noting that “the Church has never before engaged
in such [a] practice.”).
165
See generally id.; Levitz, supra note 66; Tsong, supra note 68; Harrell, supra note
160.
166
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5 (7)(A) (2006) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes
any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”).
167
See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990);
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) (“It is not within the judicial ken to
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of
162
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Northshore, the local government does not challenge the validity of the
168
religious exercise. Nevertheless, the centrality or importance of the
religious exercise to the religion is still a factor courts consider when
169
evaluating cases under RLUIPA.
For example, in Westgate Tabernacle, the court found the church
failed to satisfy the substantial burden standard because it was unable
to “show that running a homeless shelter at its specific location was
170
fundamental to its religious exercise.” The court reasoned that the
church could have found other suitable property in an appropriately
171
zoned area for its shelter.
In this instance, the broad standard offered by RLUIPA becomes almost meaningless. Churches wishing to
host tent cities will still bear as difficult of a burden of showing that
the activity is central to their religious exercise as they would have
under the Smith test because many have not hosted homeless camps
on their property before.
The tests of the circuit courts offer little hope for tent cities.
The Seventh Circuit offers a definition requiring judges to determine
the most minimal activities or facilities the church needs to prac172
tice. By denying permits to churches to host tent cities outside, the
Seventh Circuit test would not render the religious exercise of serving
the poor “effectively impractical” if churches could choose to let the
homeless sleep inside their churches. And the Second Circuit’s
173
broader definition ignores the context of the individual situation.

particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.”); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d
878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2004).
168
See Northshore, 211 P.3d at 410 (“The City conceded in its briefing in this case
the Church’s sincerity of belief.”); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14
So. 3d 1027, 1031 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“The County does not dispute that the
plaintiffs house the homeless based on deeply cherished religious beliefs.”), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009).
169
See, e.g., Stuart Circle Parish v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 946 F. Supp. 1225, 1239
(E.D. Va. 1996) (“However, the plaintiffs showed that it was central to their faith to
invite the homeless into the church in order to establish a climate of worship.”);
Westgate Tabernacle, 14 So. 3d at 1032 (“Even assuming the [city] prohibited homeless
shelters outright on RH-zoned property, Westgate would still fail to prove a substantial burden, because it did not show that running a homeless shelter at its specific
location was fundamental to its religious exercise.”).
170
Westgate Tabernacle, 14 So. 3d at 1032.
171
See id.
172
See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir.
2003)); Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 987 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
173
See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 350 (2d Cir.
2007) (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389–91
(1990)).
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Housing the tent-city residents indoors could also be a financially
174
feasible alternative that is accepted by the Second Circuit.
Homeless people who do not desire to be in shelters —or indoor-church housing, which resembles shelter living—organized tent
175
cities as an alternative. Many of these persons are service resistant,
and the freedom of the outdoor camp is what attracted them to tent
176
If courts force churches to host camps incities in the first place.
doors, tent cities might look for suitable camp property elsewhere,
inhibiting churches from hosting programs at all. It seems unlikely
that the Constitution would doom this practice from the beginning.
2.

RLUIPA and Smith Test Provide Same Protection

RLUIPA may prove unhelpful in other ways as well. It is possible, however, that zoning decisions could receive the strict scrutiny
standard under one interpretation of Smith, negating the need for
RLUIPA in religious-land-use cases, because many zoning decisions
177
are “individual assessments.”
In fact, some courts have held that
178
In
zoning board decisions do receive strict scrutiny under Smith.
the case of tent cities, unless the city has a flat prohibition on tent ci174

See id. at 352.
See Rocky Neptun, Renters Union Calls for Tent City in San Diego, S.F. BAY AREA
INDEP. MEDIA CTR. (Dec. 30, 2009, 10:32 PM), http://www.indybay.org/newsitems/
2009/12/30/18633908.php (A homeless man, responding to reporter’s question regarding his dislike of shelter: “‘Shelters are fine institutions, but not everyone belongs in an institution,’ he chortles. ‘I tried going a few times but it is such a demeaning process; some staff treat you as public vermin, criminals and sickos, while, others
order you about like little children or mental retards.’”); Shannon Moriarity, The
Dismantling of Nickelsville, END HOMELESSNESS (Oct. 2, 2009, 8:12 PM),
http://homelessness.change.org/blog/view/the_dismantling_of_nickelsville
(“To
those who called [the tent city] ‘home’ for the past year, it was more than a place to
sleep. It was a community where people typically shunned by society were accepted.
It was a place where ‘power in numbers’ meant safety, assistance, and having a
voice.”). See generally SHARE/WHEEL, supra note 55.
176
See id.
177
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)) (“[W]here the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”).
178
See, e.g., Hale O Kaula Church v. Maui Planning Comm’n, 229 F. Supp. 2d
1056, 1072–73 (D. Haw. 2002) (finding that regardless of RLUIPA the court could
review the city’s denial of a special zoning permit based on system of individualized
exemptions under strict scrutiny); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879,
886 (D. Md. 1996) (finding the compelling interest test under Smith applied to a historic preservation ordinance that created a system of individualized exemptions); Alpine Christian Fellowship v. County Comm’rs, 870 F. Supp. 991, 993–94 (D. Colo.
1994) (reviewing the city’s denial of a zoning permit to a church under strict scrutiny).
175
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ties—which is unlikely to pass rational basis review—most churches
must apply for a zoning variance or a conditional or temporary use
179
permit.
During the permit process, the local zoning board makes
an individual determination on whether to grant the church an exception to zoning regulations, much like the discretion the government has in deciding whether or not to give employment benefits
180
that justified the Sherbert decision. Therefore, under Smith, churchhosted tent city cases will be subject to strict scrutiny just as they are
under RLUIPA.
Judges also may be reluctant to give exemptions to churches out
of fear that one religion will be favored over another or out of skep181
ticism regarding what constitutes an exercise of religious beliefs.
When the religious belief is not so clear, such as the case with tent cities, the reluctance of judges to grant relief under either RLUIPA or
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment may increase.
C. Clearing up the Tests: Possible Solutions
The protections of the Free Exercise Clause remain weak in
182
comparison to other First Amendment rights.
Congress has responded by enacting statutes, RFRA and RLUIPA, in an effort to protect the Free Exercise right. While the first attempt failed both constitutionally and in practice, the second attempt has also proven
flawed. The Court, however, is unlikely to overrule Smith or find a
workable alternative to its test to overcome the criticism it has
sparked and the confusion over the individualized exemptions and
183
hybrid requirement. Thus, Congress must revise RLUIPA to avoid
the flaws that are exposed by the church-hosted homeless shelter cases. This can be achieved by creating a uniform test for “substantial
burden” under the statute.

179
If a religious institution fails to exhaust administrative remedies by at least applying for a permit and abiding by local laws, then the court will likely rule in favor of
the city. See Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1032
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (“A church must exhaust its administrative remedies and
cannot merely predict that it would be denied the permit if it were to apply.” (citing
Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 302 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1342 (M.D. Fla. 2003)), reh’g denied,
No. 4d07-3792, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009).
180
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
181
See Lupu, supra note 38, at 593.
182
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 545 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Smith improperly restricted the Free Exercise Clause and reinterpretation is needed to “put our First Amendment jurisprudence back on course”).
183
See supra Part II.A–B.
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The substantial burden definition of the Seventh, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits as substantial or significant pressure to compel a be184
liever to change his or her religious behavior and beliefs is ambiguous and subjective. It requires judges to assess the importance of
the religious practice to the individual’s or church’s religious beliefs,
a result RLUIPA clearly intended to prevent with its expansive defini185
tion of religious exercise. It also fails to take into account the context of each situation. This is especially important in tent city cases
where a religious exercise of providing shelter for those who are in
need may be accomplished in a way that creates less of a nuisance for
the surrounding community. Often cities will conditionally deny a
permit, refusing to grant the permit unless certain conditions are
186
met.
Under the Seventh Circuit test, a conditional denial would
not in many cases render the practice “effectively impracticable”—
187
and it did not in Family Life Church.
The Washington Supreme Court test for substantial burden offers a better solution. There, the court looked at the alternatives
available to churches and individuals to practice their faith under the
188
challenged government regulation. While this invites subjective determinations by judges, it correctly takes into account the context of
each set of facts. Thus, a church wishing to host a tent city must
clearly define the religious practice that it is seeking to promote,
whether it is a general ministry to help others or a more specific be184
See Vision Church v. Vill. of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (defining substantial burden as “when the government put[s] ‘substantial pressure on
an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs’” (quoting Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987))); Midrash
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (defining
substantial burden under RLUIPA as “significant pressure which directly coerces the
religious adherent to conform his or her behavior accordingly”); San Jose Christian
Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004).
185
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (“The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”
(emphasis added)).
186
See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir.
2007) (issuing a “negative declaration” that denied a religious institution a permit to
expand their facilities contingent on a environmental impact finding); Tustin
Heights Assoc. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 170 Cal. App. 2d 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (denying a permit to build a church because of space concerns but granting a permit once
amendments were made to plan); Bethel Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Morton,
559 N.E.2d 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (granting a permit to a religious school on the
condition that the expansion included an enrollment cap).
187
See Family Life Church v. City of Elgin, 561 F. Supp. 2d 978, 987 (N.D. Ill.
2008).
188
See Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352; City of Woodinville v. Northshore United Church of Christ, 211 P.3d. 406, 411, n.4 (Wash. 2009).
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lief in ensuring that everyone has appropriate shelter, and it must
further show that no other alternative would be available. In some
instances, complying with applicable zoning regulations may leave
open options for a church to host the camp with certain reasonable
189
restrictions.
By looking at the available options for the church or
individual, courts can strike a compromise between the city and the
church to balance the interests at stake and prevent churches from
taking advantage of the expansive definition of religious exercise in
RLUIPA.
In addition, policy concerns may play a bigger role in churchhosted tent cities, which a clearer definition of substantial burden
would overcome. Tent cities provide a solution to a community problem, and churches have the ability and resources to support the
camps, alleviating the burden on local governments to deal with the
problem of homelessness. These camps, however, will impact the
190
community and those living near the churches.
Context is impor191
tant for courts. If there are other possible locations for the church
to host a shelter, regardless of expense, courts may adjust their sub192
stantial burden determination. By creating a rule that forces courts
to look at context, courts have the ability to examine factors that contribute to a city’s decision to deny a permit, including public nuisance concerns.
Therefore, Congress should articulate a uniform test for substantial burden under RLUIPA that incorporates the Northshore test and a
189

See, e.g., Northshore, 211 P.3d. at 411, n.4 (“[T]he Church conceded it would be
possible to house Tent City inside the Church. Worship traditionally takes place inside a church and this alternative would obviate many of the neighbor/city legitimate
concerns.”).
190
Id. at 411.
Housing the homeless affects those outside the church in a ways that
private prayer or religious services inside the church buildings do not.
Indeed, a homeless encampment likely affects the neighbors who live
nearby far more than it impacts most parishioners who spend only
hours in church weekly while neighbors must live continuously with the
encampment.
Id.
191
See, e.g., id.
192
See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961) (Generally applicable laws
that do not come with criminal prosecution but only “make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive” do not impose a substantial burden.); Daytona Rescue
Mission v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (denying
relief in part because other facilities existed within city limits where the shelter could
be located); Westgate Tabernacle, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 14 So. 3d 1027, 1032–33
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (denying relief where church could have found other suitable property in a differently zoned area for its shelter), reh’g denied, No. 4d07-3792,
2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 12352 (Aug. 13, 2009).
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consideration of the totality of circumstances surrounding the alleged
substantial burden on religious exercise. A model test for a substantial burden on a religious exercise would state the following:
Considering all the factors surrounding the burden on religious
exercise, a substantial burden exists where no reasonable alternative is available for the church to continue its religious exercise.

Under this test, a conflict similar to the one between Western
Presbyterian and Daytona Beach may still arise as differing courts emphasize various factors, but a uniform test will lessen the opportunity
for those results. Some scholars have argued that allowing judges to
deny or grant exemptions based on weighing the interests of the city
and the church in each individual situation will lead to inconsistent
results and that courts should give more deference to legislative deci193
sions. A test that looks at the context of each situation may have an
effect of inconsistent results in similar cases—whereas a test that lists
specific factors draws a bright line to distinguish between cases—but
certain contextual factors will distinguish cases. There needs to be an
effective check on zoning board decisions when a fundamental right
is involved, especially because zoning boards are made up of politi194
cians and others who may be swayed by the majority. Granting too
much deference to local zoning boards in these cases will only add to
the inconsistency because different communities have different values; this proposed test allows courts to evaluate carefully the reasoning behind a zoning board’s decision.

193
See MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD V. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 295–
98 (2005); Marshall, supra note 153, at 311–12.
194
See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 721 (1992).
But the peculiar circumstances of minority religions and the danger of
religious majoritarianism make it necessary to buttress the political
checks with constitutional protections when the objection is based on
adherence to religion (which, given the majoritarian character of the
rule, will virtually always be a minority religion).
Id. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 604 (1991).
Exemptions granted by judges will rest exclusively on a foundation of
general norms, applicable to free exercise claims from foundation of
general norms, applicable to free exercise claims from across the “spectral march” these cases exhibit. In contrast, voluntary accommodations
will rest on an uneasy and unprincipled foundation of concern for religious liberty and the political strength of pro-accommodation forces.
Without the force of general principle, there can be no guarantee that
like claims to accommodation will be treated alike; without such like
treatment, equal religious liberty will be perpetually undermined.
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By amending RLUIPA to include a uniform test for substantial
burden that looks at the totality of the circumstances and the available alternatives to the religious organization, Congress can eliminate
the confusion over the application of the statute. Closer religious exercise cases, like church-hosted tent cities, will be decided more consistently according to the facts of each case.
V. CONCLUSION
Since Sherbert, courts and Congress have failed to articulate a
workable test for the Free Exercise Clause, which has caused problems for courts ruling on religious-land-use cases. RLUIPA has provided a clearer standard for religious-land-use cases by articulating a
strict scrutiny standard for substantial burdens on religious land use,
but it also contains ambiguity with regard to what constitutes a substantial burden. Church-hosted tent cities illustrate the extent of the
problems with RLUIPA, but these cases demonstrate that a workable
substantial burden test within the statute could alleviate its inconsistent application in the lower courts. The Washington Supreme Court
has provided a basis for developing a practical test by examining the
context of each situation and the alternatives left open to churches to
continue their religious exercise following the government action in
question. This approach takes into account each individual set of
facts, which is important in situations like tent cities, where the competing interests of the city and the church are strong on both sides.
The Free Exercise Clause has evolved in a short time from Sherbert to
Smith and has taken on new challenges from the shelter cases to
Northshore. While the test does not currently embrace what the New
Jersey Superior Court envisioned in St. John’s, a clear statutory test will
permit courts, at the very least, to rule fairly in religious-land-use cases.

